


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*25 May 77*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence


VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Sayre Stevens  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Communist Access to Western Computer  
Facilities

1. Action Requested: None; as intelligence advisor to the Export Administration Review Board -- the highest level of review in the US government export control structure -- you were sent a copy of Mr. Harman's memorandum for information only.

2. Background: The Control Data Corporation recently denied an export license to demonstrate and sell its "Technotec" service to the Soviet Union. Technotec is a computerized data base containing abstracts of technology available for sale. The major concern of US export licensing authorities was that the Technotec data base was located in the large Cybernet computer system operated by Control Data in over 150 cities in 15 Western countries. Under Secretary of Commerce Sidney Harman in a memorandum to Mr. Brzezinski at the White House expressed concern that although Technotec was denied, the general problem of Communist capability to penetrate Western computer systems warranted further examination. Consequently, he indicated that he was initiating an interagency study to look into this possibility. See attached memorandum.



SAYRE STEVENS

Attachment:  
As stated.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Commence*

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2 June 1977

MEMORANDUM

Communist Access to Western Computer Facilities

Computer experts in the Office of Security, Office of Data Processing, Office of Scientific Intelligence, and the DDO agree that it is nearly impossible to prevent penetration of a computer system by a trained programmer, providing he knows the system's operational software and has access to a terminal connected to the system. At present there is no technical method for preventing (or even detecting) such a penetration. The problem of penetration becomes much greater with a system such as Cybernet which has some 5,000 subscribers. It is possible, although we have no evidence of such, that the Communists already have access to the system through one of these subscribers. Similarly, it is possible that other time sharing computer systems in use in the West already have Communist users.

There is some question as to how the Communists might use such access. It is clear that they could extract whatever information is on the system. This type of information almost certainly is unclassified from a security standpoint but may well include data of a proprietary nature. The Soviets use every means possible to acquire Western technology and industrial intelligence. Penetration of such a system as Cybernet would be one of the ways this could be accomplished. It is uncertain that the Soviets would use a computer located in the West to run programs for strategic purposes as DOD representatives suggest. To do so would risk exposure of these programs to others using the system -- a possibility the security-conscious Soviets are unlikely to chance.

Finally, it should be noted that the Control Data Corporation has resubmitted its case after having been turned down on the earlier version described in Mr. Harman's memorandum. In its latest proposal, Control Data offered to pull the Technotec service off the Cybernet system and use another computer dedicated only to Technotec. This case has a better chance of being approved.

